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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, policymakers and the public have condemned the 
inadequacy of the law governing punishment for white-collar crimes.1  In 
response to this ferment, all three branches of government have transformed 
that law.  Some reforms have flourished and others have foundered: 
determinate sentencing has come and gone, but more sophisticated 
frameworks for linking punishment to harm and culpability have emerged 
and may continue to develop.  Throughout this process, the severity and 
scope of recommended carceral penalties for white-collar offenses has 
steadily grown, ensuring that stiff punishments await all serious offenders, 
in proportion to the harm they have caused.  Such changes have likely 
increased the deterrence and expressive–retributive effects of the law 
governing white-collar crime.  
With these reforms in place, it is now time to consider cost-effective, 
complementary sanctions designed to encourage prompt victim redress and 
socially beneficial behavior.  Although prison sentences rightfully play an 
important role in the means of punishment mix, incarceration should not 
overpower other measures that can limit the adverse societal impacts of 
white-collar crime.  Such wrongdoing causes economic harm in the first 
instance, and punishment for it should aim, at least in significant part, to 
efficiently and effectively minimize that harm.  Starting from that premise, 
this Comment argues that courts and the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) should encourage restorative behavior by expanding 
formal measures to modestly mitigate carceral punishment when an 
offender voluntarily and promptly pays victims restitution. 
Restitution is a familiar tool.  Court-ordered restitution is used widely 
in white-collar cases, and voluntary restitution also plays a background role, 
although published decisions rarely acknowledge and examine it.  While the 
availability of mandatory restitution may appear on its face to obviate the 
 
1 White-collar crime includes such crimes as money laundering, embezzlement, and a 
range of fraud offenses (e.g., bankruptcy fraud, corporate fraud, financial institution fraud, 
health care fraud, hedge fund fraud, insurance fraud, mass marketing fraud, mortgage fraud, 
and securities fraud).  See White-Collar Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://goo.gl/bHS5jc (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
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need to encourage offenders to voluntarily repay their victims, a closer look 
at existing practices demonstrates that the prevailing mandatory approach is 
ineffective.  Mechanisms for enforcing restitution judgments are imperfect 
at best, collection rates are abysmally low, and offenders use a panoply of 
evasive tactics to avoid their obligations.2  Consequently, mandatory 
restitution orders may have expressive value, but their restorative effects 
tend to fall short of the mark.  Their use in lieu of possibly more helpful 
alternative measures fails to leverage the power of the courts to induce 
remedial, and possibly more socially responsible, behavior. 
The policy considerations motivating the drive to incarcerate economic 
offenders and expand the use of mandatory restitution have been sound.  
Efforts to strengthen the deterrent effect of laws governing economic crimes 
and to bring punishments for those crimes into closer alignment with 
punishments for “street crimes” have made white-collar prison sentences 
fairer, and also more responsive to public assessments of reprehensibility.  
In the aftermath of outbreaks of financial mega-crimes, such as the 
Adelphia, Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom frauds, sentencing reforms have 
ensured that the scale of available punishments has increased to fit the scale 
of actual crimes.  
It is now time to expand on these reforms by turning to victims’ 
interests.  As United States v. Booker3 and its progeny settle into our 
sentencing scheme, a paradigm shift in sentencing is at hand.  Federal 
judges now have considerably more leeway to make individualized 
sentencing decisions and must balance the principal theories of punishment 
when making these decisions.  Rather than rely solely on the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, judges may now impose punishments that deviate 
 
2 For a more detailed discussion of restitution collection rates, see infra notes 115–18 
and accompanying text.  The proceedings following the 2008 guilty plea agreement in the 
prosecution of former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick illustrate what can go wrong after a 
court has entered a restitution order.  Facing several felony charges, Kilpatrick agreed to pay 
the City of Detroit $1 million in restitution.  M.L. Elrick et al., Kilpatrick to City: ‘There’s 
Another Day for Me,’ DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 4, 2008, 1:59 PM), http://goo.gl/XQYTKi.  
In the ensuing four years, Michigan courts repeatedly stepped in to consider issues related to 
the enforcement of that agreement.  See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Text Message Scandal: 
Kilpatrick to Pay More on Restitution, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 2, 2012, at 4A (detailing 
the order that increased Kilpatrick’s payments from $160 per month to $500 per month 
toward the $859,222.80 still owed and reporting Kilpatrick’s pending appeal of the order); 
Jim Schaefer et al., ‘I Lied’: Mayor Admits Guilt, Resigns from Office—Scandal that 
Crippled City Ends with 2 Felony Convictions, 4 Months in Jail, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 
5, 2008, at 1S (describing the plea agreement).  When Kilpatrick was convicted of corruption 
charges in March 2013, he still owed the City of Detroit $854,062.20.  Tresa Baldas & Jim 
Schaefer, Kilpatrick Can’t Escape Restitution: Locked Up, He’s Still on Hook for Debt to 
City, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 13, 2013, at 1A. 
3 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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from those Guidelines, provided that their punishments comport with the 
considerations set forth in the governing statutes.  With the return of 
judicial discretion to the sentencing field, it is not only possible but may 
indeed be necessary to develop a structural approach to white-collar 
sentencing that is more responsive to victims’ compensatory interests.  
Without one, we may witness a slow erosion of the uniformity obtained by 
two decades of binding sentencing policy: judges may increasingly use their 
newly granted discretion to impose ad hoc sentences that recognize 
offenders’ voluntary attempts to compensate victims in individual cases, 
potentially leading to fractured and unpredictable sentencing practices.4  
Formally recognizing and expanding the role of restorative measures 
through the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines encourages judges to consider 
victim interests in a uniform manner.  This may, in turn, promote more 
uniform sentencing outcomes overall.   
In recent years, scholars and practitioners debated many possible 
sentencing policy changes.  Some, but relatively few, have made detailed 
proposals for the expanded use of complementary or alternative 
punishments.  Indeed, since Booker, much commentary on white-collar 
sentencing has focused on rethinking the measurement of economic loss5 
and its role in the existing sentencing framework.6  Other authors have 
addressed problems of overcriminalization,7 overpunishment or context-
insensitive punishment,8 and underpunishment.9  A smaller set of authors 
 
4 The discretion Booker and its progeny have granted to judges has gradually eroded the 
(relatively) uniform sentencing results achieved in the pre-Booker era.  See infra Part I.B.  A 
national sentencing policy encourages uniformity.  But without binding force, such a policy 
must maintain judicial support if it is to have this effect over the long term. 
5 See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 738–39 (2005); Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences 
After Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
757, 773–78 (2006); Lana L. Freeman, Note, Sentences Should Be Reasonable, Not 
Shocking: A De-emphasis on Loss for Federal Securities Fraud Sentencing, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 969, 997–1002; Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More 
Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1012 (2010). 
6 David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, Essay, “Losing Ground”—In Search of a Remedy 
for the Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing Guidelines for 
Fraud and Theft, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 154–55 (2011); John D. Esterhay, 
Apples and Oranges: Securities Market Losses Should Be Treated Differently for Major White-
Collar Criminal Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 76 MO. L. REV. 1113, 1139 (2011); 
Danielle DeMasi Chattin, Note, The More You Gain, the More You Lose: Sentencing Insider 
Trading Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 211–13 (2010). 
7 J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, Martha, 
and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 55–57 (2007). 
8 Rodney D. Perkins, Purposes-Based Sentencing of Economic Crimes After Booker, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 528–36 (2007) (arguing in favor of using the existing 
sentencing statute to mitigate white-collar punishments when the Guidelines provide a 
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have addressed noncarceral measures.  Several of these authors have 
discussed introducing to the sentencing process sanctions such as 
shaming,10 criminal fines pegged to offenders’ wealth,11 asset forfeiture,12 
and computer use restrictions for Internet offenders.13  Others have 
 
flawed or unacceptable benchmark); Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar 
Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 756–58 (2007) [hereinafter Podgor, The 
Challenge] (arguing that current white-collar sentencing law fails to adequately consider 
offenders’ culpability, the unique characteristics of white-collar crime, and offenders’ future 
dangerousness); Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk 
Game, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 87 (2010) (noting that costs and risks of white-collar trials 
have created a state of affairs where plea-bargaining strategy, rather than innocence or guilt, 
is the preeminent consideration in white-collar prosecution); Note, Go Directly to Jail: White 
Collar Sentencing After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1732–39 (2009) 
(arguing that the current sentencing model underdeters white-collar crime, overpunishes 
small-scale offenders, and leads to uneven outcomes). 
9 Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of Increased Judicial 
Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 637–39 (2007); John D. 
Esterhay, Note “Street Justice” for Corporate Fraud—Mandatory Minimums for Major 
White-Collar Crime, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 135, 165–89 (2009); Casey C. Kannenberg, 
Note, From Booker to Gall: The Evolution of the Reasonableness Doctrine as Applied to 
White-Collar Criminals and Sentencing Variances, 34 J. CORP. L. 349, 378–79 (2008). 
10 Bibas, supra note 5, at 739–40; Mirela V. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading 
Criminalization and Sentencing Reform, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 267, 304–08 (2012). 
11 Max Schanzenbach & Michael L. Yaeger, Prison Time, Fines, and Federal White-
Collar Criminals: The Anatomy of a Racial Disparity, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 
792 (2006) (“There are a couple of important policy implications to be drawn from the 
analysis.  First, if fines are more heavily relied upon, the analysis suggests that racial 
disparities in prison sentences, particularly those between black[s] and whites, might 
increase.  Second, if racial disparities in white-collar sentences and fines are driven partly by 
income levels and unobserved assets, then a more creative system of fining and ascertaining 
the ability of offenders to pay fines might actually reduce observed racial disparities.  If fines 
are made proportionate to wealth and a system of payment options is created, prison time 
may be forgiven in a more equitable fashion.”). 
12 Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 49 (2008) (explaining the statutory basis for criminal 
forfeiture in white-collar cases); Catherine E. McCaw, Asset Forfeiture as a Form of 
Punishment: A Case for Integrating Asset Forfeiture into Criminal Sentencing, 38 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 181, 197–203 (2011) (arguing that asset forfeiture may serve the same deterrence 
and retribution aims effectuated by incarceration and should be considered as a viable 
alternative or complementary punishment); Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-
enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 321, 327 (2007) (arguing that, in securities fraud cases, “any funds obtained 
(including any profits gained or losses avoided), as well as any assets traceable thereto, 
should be forfeited. . . .  [And these forfeited losses should be] returned to the corporation, or 
to victimized investors”). 
13 Katharine A. Alexander, Comment, Bullseye on the Nation’s Back: Combating the 
Heightened Threat of Pedestrian Economic Criminals, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 559, 
591–94 (2011) (recommending that courts expand the application of computer use 
restrictions to punish white-collar crimes committed online). 
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addressed, and recommended, the use of “restorative justice” to supplement 
existing white-collar punishment.14  The role of restitution, meanwhile, 
appears to have only entered the literature in passing or as a subsidiary 
component of proposed reforms.15 
Among these authors, Professor Stephanos Bibas describes one 
alternative approach to sentencing after Booker.  Professor Bibas argues 
that combining “short but certain terms of imprisonment” with the use of 
restitution and other noncarceral sanctions will permit the USSC to “foster 
deterrence, inflict retribution, express condemnation, and heal victims at a 
fraction of the cost,” thus “calibrat[ing] white-collar sentences to their core 
purpose.”16  This Comment does not question the soundness of current 
Guidelines-range sentences.  Instead, this Comment urges courts and the 
USSC to continue the white-collar sentencing “calibration” process by 
establishing formal measures to more fully recognize the voluntary, pre-
sentencing payment of victim restitution by offenders—a reform that 
imposes fewer costs or administrative burdens than most other proposed 
complementary sanctions. 
By using voluntary restitution for “autocorrection” as a “carrot” to 
balance the “stick” of incarceration, courts can encourage offenders to 
directly and promptly repay victims.  If voluntary restitution emerges from 
 
14 See, e.g., Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: 
Restorative Justice and White-Collar Crime, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 421, 423 
(2007) (arguing that “restorative justice interventions are warranted and possible even in 
high-profile white-collar crime cases where restorative justice has not been applied to date” 
and suggesting that a model “inspired by the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
[Commission]” might be used in place of “conventional restorative justice process models 
such as victim-offender mediation, group conferencing and circles” in cases of high-profile 
financial crime (citation omitted)); see also id. at 451 (suggesting that “introducing 
restorative justice to high-profile white-collar crime must be coupled with the current 
traditional responses,”  since “only through such a structure can the use of restorative 
interventions be justified from both a retributive and a utilitarian perspective”). 
15 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 739–40. 
16 Id. at 739.  “The combination of [apology, restitution, and public shaming] might 
foster deterrence, inflict retribution, express condemnation, and heal victims at a fraction of 
the cost.”  Id. at 740.  “It would condemn and deter crime ex ante without sacrificing ex post 
individualized justice.”  Id.  For purposes of this Comment, the core aims of sentencing are 
those set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).  Those aims include:  
 deterrence, § 3553 (a)(2)(B);  
 incapacitation, § 3553(a)(2)(C);  
 rehabilitation, § 3553(a)(2)(D); and 
 just punishment, § 3553(a)(2)(A).  
The parsimony provision of § 3553(a) enjoins courts to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary” to comply with the goals set forth in § 3553(a)(2) and directs 
courts to consider a series of factors when crafting a sentence; § 3553(a)(7) identifies “the 
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense” as one such factor.  
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the shadows of the sentencing process in a form that can be reliably 
recognized and applied, more offenders might be persuaded to cooperate.  
Such an incentive would reduce the destructive impact of financial crime, 
which judges must already consider when sentencing white-collar 
offenders. 
Restitutive principles need not (and should not) be the only principles 
animating criminal punishment.17  Nonetheless, they advance substantial 
public interests and should play a wider, more explicit role in the sentencing 
process.  Toward that end, this Comment argues in favor of expanding the 
role of voluntary restitution as a complementary measure that judges may 
use to modestly mitigate existing Guidelines-range sentences.  Operating in 
this way, voluntary restitution does not compromise existing punishments.  
Instead, the proposed reform provides judges and offenders with a device 
that leads to better calibrated sentencing outcomes. 
Resultantly, this Comment discusses the unique contribution that 
voluntary restitution can make to the white-collar sentencing process and 
sets forth a comprehensive proposal for encouraging it through the post-
Booker federal sentencing process.  Part I summarizes the development and 
current state of white-collar sentencing law, Part II discusses the advantages 
and drawbacks of accounting for voluntary restitution in sentencing, and 
Part III sets forth a proposed reform. 
 
17 Advocates of “restitutive justice” argue that restitution should entirely replace the 
current system of penal sanctions.  See Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, 
Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 160 (1996) 
(arguing that “(1) injustice arises when one person violates the rights of another; (2) justice 
requires the rectification of this rights violation; and (3) rectification should consist of 
forcing the offender to raise the victim up—restitution—rather than lowering the criminal to 
the level of his victim—punishment”); Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of 
Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977).  Restitutive justice, however, does not address the 
extent to which crimes represent offenses against the public, the corresponding public 
interest in expressive and retributive sanctions, or the role of these sanctions in deterring 
future bad acts.  For a critique of penal restitution that addresses these and other points, see 
Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individuality, 77 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 977 (1986) (“[T]heories of restitution . . . fail to account for the 
complementary relationship which exists between the adjudicatory and sanctioning phases of 
the criminal process.  In addition, they do not comprehend the larger institutional role which 
each plays in creating social cohesion.”). 
396 DANIEL FAICHNEY [Vol. 104 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF CURRENT WHITE-COLLAR SENTENCING POLICY 
A. REFORMS BEFORE UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
Starting in 2001, a spate of corporate scandals thrust white-collar 
crime into the spotlight.  Enron came first,18 followed in turn by 
WorldCom,19 Tyco,20 and Adelphia.21 Commentators responded with 
outrage, and a majority of the public supported far-reaching reforms.22  
Congress took notice, and passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
July 2002.23  SOX included components intended to effectuate corporate 
governance and accounting reform24 as well as provisions that addressed 
white-collar sentencing.25  The former provided tools to deter or otherwise 
prevent future frauds, while the latter directed the USSC to impose stiffer 
punishments for white-collar crimes, especially highly egregious ones, such 
as frauds that threaten the financial solvency of more than fifty 
 
18 In November 2001, months after Enron’s financial health took a turn for the worse, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission commenced an investigation into the company.  See 
Alex Berenson, S.E.C. Opens Investigation into Enron: A Company Fails to Explain 
Dealings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at C4.  One month later on December 2, 2001, the 
company filed for bankruptcy.  Riva D. Atlas, The Process: Path to Settling the Claims Will 
Be a Long One, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A16. 
19 Following the announcement that the Securities and Exchange Commission charged 
WorldCom with fraud, the company filed for bankruptcy in July 2002.  Simon Romero & 
Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case: $107 Billion Collapse 
Isn’t Likely to Disrupt Service, for Now, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1.  In 2004, federal 
prosecutors filed criminal charges against the company’s former chief executive officer, 
Bernard Ebbers, leading to a conviction in March 2005.  See United States v. Ebbers, 458 
F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006). 
20 Top Tyco managers and officers were indicted in September 2002.  See Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged with $600 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2002, at A1. 
21 In September 2002, only days after the Tyco indictments, federal prosecutors filed 
charges against Adelphia’s founder, his two sons, and former managers, alleging a 
conspiracy to hide $2.5 billion in misappropriated funds.  Geraldine Fabrikant, Indictments 
for Founder of Adelphia and Two Sons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at C1. 
22 Rage against the executives ran so high in some quarters that one writer compared 
WorldCom’s Bernard Ebbers to Osama bin Laden.  Daniel Gross, Bernie bin Laden, SLATE 
(Sept. 10, 2002, 6:50 PM), http://goo.gl/UBI4v1.  Meanwhile, one poll found that 56% of 
Americans supported either a “complete overhaul” or “major reforms” of corporate auditing 
practices, and another reported that the percentage of respondents who thought that there was 
“too little” regulation of big business nearly doubled between 2001 and 2002.  Big Business, 
GALLUP, http://goo.gl/jYxmnY (last visited Apr. 19, 2014); David W. Moore, Public: Major 
Auditing Reforms Needed, GALLUP (Feb. 26, 2002), http://goo.gl/CJhN4W. 
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
24 Id. §§ 101–501 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
25 Id. §§ 801–1107 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
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individuals.26  Title IX,27 the White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act 
of 2002 (WCCPA) contains pieces of both.  It set harsher penalties for some 
existing offenses,28 created new offenses (including destruction of corporate 
audit records and certifying noncompliant financial reports), and suggested 
enhancements to the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the USSC.29  
While the WCCPA arrived too late to play a role in convicting and 
sentencing the Enron principals, it changed corporate governance and its 
regulation30 as well as revamped the punishments that apply to those who 
violate these rules.31  It was, in other words, something along the lines of 
what the public sought:32 a legislative effort intended to shift the norms 
involving white-collar misconduct.33 
On the punitive side, the tasks of defining and revising punishments 
and determining the standards on which they rested fell to the USSC.  The 
USSC responded to SOX by establishing longer sentences for white-collar 
crimes that either impacted large numbers of people or were committed by 
managers.34  This action comported with a trend that dated to the inception 
 
26 See, e.g., JOHN R. STEER, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 10–12 (2003), available at http://goo.gl/L1qShH. 
27 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 901. 
28 These penalties included “quadrupling the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud 
(from five to 20 years’ imprisonment), and equating the maximum penalties for fraud 
attempts and conspiracies with the penalties for the underlying substantive offense.”  STEER, 
supra note 26, at 9. 
29 Id. at 15 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1350, and 1520 (2012)). 
30 See Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate 
Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 82–108 (2006). 
31 See STEER, supra note 26, at 9. 
32 For a discussion of public sentiment around this time, see supra note 22. 
33 Former President George W. Bush, who signed SOX into law, called its provisions the 
“most far reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://goo.gl/2xSkEF (last visited Apr. 19, 2014).  The extent to which SOX has actually 
succeeded is an open question.  The WCCPA steeply increased penalties for some white-
collar offenses, but one critic argues that it failed to provide an effective mechanism for 
differentiating between the more serious crimes and the less serious ones.  See, e.g., Note, 
supra note 8, at 1730.  As a result, the critic says, it “underdeters massive fraud, [and] 
simultaneously overdeters the much more common minor white collar crimes.”  Id. 
34 Notably, the USSC: 
(1) added a new sentencing enhancement category for offenders whose crime(s) impose an economic 
loss on more than 250 people, so that offenders in this category face an “almost double[d]” sentence as 
compared with those whose crime(s) impacted fewer than 250 people;  
(2) provided a set of factors intended to help courts measure the scope of harm in large-scale cases; and  
(3) added an additional enhancement of up to 50% of the Guideline-range sentence applicable in 
securities fraud cases where the offender is a “corporate officer or director at the time of the offense.” 
STEER, supra note 26, at 10–13. 
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of the USSC and indeed was understood to be a major part of the USSC’s 
mandate: stiffening white-collar sentences and eliminating the disparity 
between such sentences and those imposed for other crimes.35  Before SOX, 
the USSC repeatedly acted on this mandate, sometimes in concert with 
Congress.  In prior years, for instance, the USSC responded to legislative 
mandates to increase penalties for “(1) frauds against the elderly, (2) 
international currency counterfeiting, (3) computer crimes, (4) electronic 
copyright infringement, (5) telemarketing fraud, (6) cellular telephone 
cloning, (7) identity theft, and (8) higher education financial assistance 
fraud.”36  The USSC also reformed white-collar sentencing on its own 
initiative by adjusting the Guidelines’ monetary loss table37 and by 
engaging in a six-year review of its economic crime provisions, which 
culminated in releasing new guidelines.38 
Although the shifts in white-collar sentencing policy did not generate 
penalty increases as dramatic as those seen in sentencing for some other 
types of crimes,39 the trend toward imposing harsher penalties for economic 
 
35 See id. at 1 (“Th[e] first group of commissioners also carefully studied the 
Commission’s organic statute and its legislative history.  They found therein strong 
indications that Congress wanted the Commission to toughen the sentences for fraud, 
embezzlement, and other economic crimes.  The Commission did just that, reducing 
substantially the general availability of probation sentences, and increasing the likelihood 
that ‘white-collar’[ ]criminals would have to spend some time in jail . . . .”); see also United 
States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008) (“One of the central reasons for creating 
the sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar crimes and to 
eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for other crimes.”). 
36 STEER, supra note 26, at 3. 
37 The loss table is a fixture of the Guidelines’ white-collar provisions that provides for 
sentencing enhancements corresponding with the magnitude of monetary losses caused by 
the crime.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2012), available at 
http://goo.gl/aJwHeh.  Past editions of the Sentencing Guidelines are also available.  See 
Guidelines Manual Archives, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://goo.gl/UiUrkS (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2014). 
38 STEER, supra note 26, at 3–9; see Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic 
Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 32–37 
(2001) (describing the procedural history of the 2001 economic crime package).  The 
revisions modified the then-existing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1 (theft guidelines) 
and § 2F1.1 (fraud guidelines), and consolidated them within a single section, § 2B1.1.  Id. at 
7 n.1.  As Judge Diana Murphy, chair of the USSC in 2001, explained in a contemporary 
article, the 2001 economic crime amendment package “simplif[ied the] Guidelines 
application for economic crimes, significantly increase[d] penalties for offenses involving 
high dollar losses, and provide[d] more discretion to judges in sentencing defendants who 
caused or intended relatively low losses.”  Diana E. Murphy, Inside the United States 
Sentencing Commission: Federal Sentencing Policy in 2001 and Beyond, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
359, 363–64 (2002). 
39 See Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-
Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286, 287 (2007) (noting that the average fraud 
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crimes did broadly track with a systemic shift in the criminal law over the 
last three decades.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 198440 (which created 
the USSC and made its sentencing guidelines binding on judges) set forth a 
host of punishment theories and considerations intended to guide sentencing 
decisions.41  Nonetheless, much legislation since that time has focused on 
“deterrence,” “incapacitation,” and the goal of “communicat[ing] with the 
offender about her wrongdoing,”42 all of which find their primary 
expression in incarceration.43 
The USSC’s SOX implementation process was consistent with 
systemic shifts in sentencing in general and white-collar sentencing in 
particular, but it was also one of the USSC’s final major acts before the 
judicially binding sentencing guidelines succumbed to a constitutional 
challenge.  In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. 
 
sentence increased by 5.3 months between 1995 and 2005, while the average sentence for 
national security crimes increased sixfold, to 126.7 months). 
40 Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–39, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987–2040 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).  
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (7) (2012) (including such aims as rehabilitation and 
victim compensation). 
42 Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 
1327–28 (2007).  Shifts in drug-related sentencing since 1980 illustrate this trend most 
clearly.  Between 1980 and 2003, the number of prisoners serving time for drug-related 
offenses increased twelvefold.  MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-
YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 9 (2007), 
available at http://goo.gl/wafjES.  Meanwhile, between 1991 and 2004, inmate participation 
in drug treatment programs fell by more than half.  Id. at 15. 
43 This development is consistent with Professor William Stuntz’s theory of the political 
dynamics of criminal law, which posits that the incentives governing criminal legislation and 
enforcement tend to turn the criminal law into a “one-way ratchet,” turning steadily toward 
broader proscription and higher penalties; ratchet-turning minimizes prosecutors’ overall 
costs of obtaining convictions and manages the risk of public backlash against legislators.  
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519–
20, 546–57 (2001).  “Most criminal laws are written reactively[—]an event happens, and 
Congress provides legislation to appease the public.”  Podgor, The Challenge, supra note 8, 
at 743.  Large majorities of the general public have favored increased incarceration at points 
during the past twenty years: During the 1988–91 sampling period, nearly 84% of General 
Social Survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that 
“[p]eople who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.”  NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., 
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–2012: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 2363 (2013), available at 
http://goo.gl/Au3wBr.  Some new evidence shows that public appetites for more 
incarceration may now be waning.  See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC OPINION ON 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AMERICA 2–5 (2012), available at 
http://goo.gl/r0wr9m (reporting the results of a 2010 survey showing that 45% of 
respondents believe the American prison population is too large and showing that large 
majorities of respondents support reducing prison sentences for nonviolent offenders and 
favor prioritizing recidivism reduction over time served). 
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Booker.44  In Booker, the Court abrogated the portion of the Sentencing 
Reform Act45 that made the Guidelines mandatory.46  Booker did not write 
the Guidelines out of existence; rather, it ordered judges to “consult” the 
Guidelines when calculating an appropriate sentence.47  Decisions rendered 
under this new framework would then be subject to appellate review for 
reasonableness.48 
B. DISCRETION RETURNS AFTER BOOKER 
In the wake of Booker, the Supreme Court carved out a new role for 
the Guidelines.  In Rita v. United States, the Court clarified the standard of 
appellate review governing sentencing decisions and held that Guidelines-
range sentences are presumptively reasonable.49   
Early in the following term, the Court held in Gall v. United States that 
a below-Guidelines, noncustodial sentence for a former drug dealer was 
“reasonable” because it reflected the sentencing judge’s considered, 
individualized assessment of the facts relevant to sentencing.50  As the 
Court explained, the district judge carefully evaluated the offender’s 
conduct, finding evidence of rehabilitation in both the offender’s pre-
indictment decision to abandon his drug-dealing enterprise and his 
cooperation with authorities after indictment.51  Compelled by this 
rehabilitation evidence, the district judge departed from the Guidelines and 
ordered the offender to serve a term of probation.52  The Supreme Court 
upheld the decision over the Eighth Circuit’s objection, noting that Booker 
made strict adherence to the Guidelines’ sentencing formula inappropriate.  
The Court explained that circuit courts “must give due deference to the 
 
44 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
45 Id. at 259 (abrogating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV)). 
46 The binding guidelines did, however, survive an early constitutional challenge.  See 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
47 Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 
48 Id. at 261. 
49 See 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (holding that (1) sentencing judges must consult the 
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (2) any sentence that falls within the 
Guidelines range is presumed reasonable for purposes of appellate review; and (3) the 
“reasonableness” standard governing such review is equivalent to abuse of discretion). 
50 552 U.S. 38, 53–57 (2007). 
51 Id. at 43–45. 
52 Specifically, the district court judge reasoned that “[a]ny term of imprisonment in this 
case would be countereffective by depriving society of the contributions of the Defendant 
who, the Court has found, understands the consequences of his criminal conduct and is doing 
everything in his power to forge a new life.  The Defendant’s post-offense conduct indicates 
neither that he will return to criminal behavior nor that the Defendant is a danger to society.”  
United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (S.D. Iowa 2005). 
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district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify the 
extent of the variance.”53  Determining whether a variance is justified is 
necessarily an individualized process: “It has been uniform and constant in 
the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every 
convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the 
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and 
the punishment to ensue.”54 
The Court next articulated a deferential approach to judicial policy 
decisions in sentencing.  In Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme 
Court’s third post-Booker sentencing case, the Court upheld a below-
Guidelines sentence for a crack dealer.55  In that case, the district judge 
disagreed with the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity and adjusted 
the offender’s sentence accordingly.56  The Supreme Court upheld that 
sentence, noting that the district judge’s assessment of narcotics sentencing 
policy was a valid consideration in determining a “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary” sentence under § 3553(a).57 
The upshot of Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough is that judges once again 
have considerable discretion to make individualized determinations based 
on all of the major sentencing rationales when choosing the appropriate 
sentence to impose.  The statute governing the requisite initial phase of 
judicial penal analysis, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sets forth the principal 
sentencing goals and permits judges to consider nearly all of the leading 
theories of punishment and related considerations, including retribution58 
 
53 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors set forth policy rationales that 
judges must consult, per Booker, when making a sentencing decision. 
54 Id. at 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
55 552 U.S. 85, 91–93 (2007). 
56 Id. at 92–93. 
57 Id. at 110–11 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Lower courts have since read Kimbrough to extend beyond the realm of drug sentencing.  
See United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002–05 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (departing 
downward from the Guidelines range in a child pornography case in which the applicable 
Guidelines did not permit judges to distinguish between the “most and the least egregious” 
offenders and, consequently, did not support individualized application of the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553 factors).  Policy-based deviations were not always reversed even before Kimbrough.  
See United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming, pre-
Kimbrough, the trial court’s below-Guidelines sentence for child pornography possession 
premised on disagreement with the Guidelines’ treatment of sentence-mitigating factors). 
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012) (explaining that sentences should be designed 
“to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense”). 
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(or “just deserts”59), incapacitation,60 general deterrence,61 rehabilitation,62 
uniformity,63 and victim remediation.64  As long as the judge’s sentencing 
decision is not egregious65 and comports with the utilitarian injunction that 
sentences be “sufficient, but no greater than necessary” to comply with the 
§ 3553(a) factors, that decision should survive appellate review.  Empirical 
data illustrates the effects of this change: the Guidelines continue to set 
basic sentencing norms, but individualized assessment and policy analysis 
have measurably altered aggregate sentencing outcomes.66 
 
59 See William W. Berry III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in 
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 247, 253–54 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011). 
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (explaining that sentences should be designed “to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”). 
61 See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (explaining that sentences should be designed “to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”). 
62 See id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (explaining that sentences should be designed “to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner”). 
63 See id. § 3553(a)(6) (explaining “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). 
64 See id. § 3553(a)(7) (explaining “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense”). 
65 What constitutes egregiousness (that is, an abuse of discretion) in the white-collar 
context is still being worked out in the circuit courts.  See John H. Chun & Gregory M. 
Gilchrist, Challenges for White Collar Sentencing in the Post-Booker Era, CHAMPION, 
May/June 2008, at 36. 
66 Reports from the district courts shed some light on changes currently afoot.  A 
national study on interjudge sentencing variation found statistically significant variations in 
approximately 60% of courthouses.  Susan B. Long & David Burnham, TRAC Report: 
Examining Current Federal Sentencing Practices: A National Study of Differences Among 
Judges, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 15 (2012).  The Long and Burnham study did not consider 
the extent to which sentences conformed to the Guidelines, but rather considered only 
interjudge variation within courthouses and between districts in 370,000 criminal cases 
completed between 2007 and 2011.  Id.  It found, among other things, that the median white-
collar sentence spanned a 39-month range between the lowest sentencing judge and the 
highest sentencing judge in the Northern District of Illinois (making it the widest varying 
district in the nation), a 23.5-month range in Atlanta (fourth-widest varying), a 22.5-month 
range in Manhattan (sixth-widest varying), and a 19.5-month range in Kansas City (tenth-
widest varying).  Id.; see also Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity after 
Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2010) (noting that, among Boston judges 
in the District of Massachusetts, “the effect of the judge on sentence length is now twice as 
strong as in the three years before Booker”).  Nonetheless, the Guidelines still form the 
bedrock of federal sentencing, especially in some districts.  In 2003, the ten districts that 
complied least with the Guidelines still complied between 41% (District of Arizona) and 
64.7% (District of New Jersey) of the time, while the ten most compliant districts in that year 
issued Guidelines-range sentences between 88.9% (Western District of Oklahoma) and 
82.1% (District of Utah) of the time.  Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the 
Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 362 fig.4A 
(2012).  In 2011, the comparable ranges were 24.6% (Eastern District of Wisconsin) to 
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C. WHITE-COLLAR SENTENCING MITIGATION AFTER BOOKER 
In the white-collar context, judges have used their post-Booker 
discretion to make significant “downward departures”67 from Guidelines-
range sentences.  Many of these non-Guidelines sentences have been 
vacated on appeal.68  Circuit courts, in deciding to vacate, have either 
explicitly or implicitly expressed misgivings about treating white-collar 
offenders too leniently, as had occurred in the pre-Guidelines era.69  Courts 
have also specifically noted their intentions to avoid creating the perception 
that white-collar offenders can “buy their way” out of a prison sentence.70 
 
34.9% (Southern District of New York) at the low end, and 80.4% (Southern District of 
Mississippi) to 70.6% (Middle District of North Carolina) at the high end.  Id. at 362 fig.4B; 
see also Berry, supra note 59, at 258 (“Despite the broader discretion offered and even 
required of judges under Booker and section 3553, judges have adopted the guideline 
sentence in an overwhelming majority of cases.”). 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745, 754–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(imposing a sixty-month sentence on fraud offenders despite a Guidelines range of 360 
months to life, and explaining why the Guidelines did not yield a sentence that comported 
with § 3553(a)).  After Booker, the term “departure” no longer has the same significance.  
See United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “instead of 
employing the pre-Booker terminology of departures, we have moved toward characterizing 
sentences as either fitting within the advisory guidelines range or not”).  Nevertheless, given 
that the Guidelines remain the starting point of the federal sentencing calculus, Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), and an appellate court may (though need not) presume 
that a within-Guidelines sentence is “reasonable” for the purposes of appellate review, id., 
the term “downward departure” remains a useful shorthand for sentences that deviate from 
the Guidelines norms.  
68 See, e.g., United States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 2013) (vacating a seven-
day sentence where the offender’s Guidelines calculation called for 97–121 months); United 
States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1287–89; 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence of 
restitution and five hours’ confinement where the fraud offender’s Guidelines calculation 
was twenty-four to thirty months and the offender was unlikely to satisfy the restitution 
judgment upon which the district judge justified the departure); see also Matthew A. Ford, 
Note, White-Collar Crime, Social Harm, and Punishment: A Critique and Modification of 
the Sixth Circuit’s Ruling in United States v. Davis, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 383, 385 n.11 
(2008) (listing cases where sentences were vacated on appeal). 
69 “[I]n enacting § 3553, Congress was especially concerned that prior to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, [m]ajor white collar criminals often [were] sentenced to small fines and little or 
no imprisonment.”  United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1291 
(11th Cir. 2006) (noting, in a case where an offender’s fraud caused a loss of over $480,000 
to a small family-owned bank and the district court imposed a probation-only sentence, that 
the USSC deliberately linked financial loss to sentencing severity to reflect the offense’s 
seriousness, and holding that the lenient punishment did not comport with this goal); cf. 
United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Guidelines 
sought to eradicate the disparities between punishments for “street crime” and punishments 
for white-collar crime).  
70 See, e.g., United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Allowing 
sentencing courts to depart downward based on a defendant’s ability to make restitution 
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Despite these considerations, circuit courts have not vacated all 
significantly downward-departing white-collar sentences.71  In evaluating 
the sentences that have survived appellate review both before and after 
Booker, several themes emerge.  Some courts have recognized defendants’ 
public, expressive good works involving “hands-on, personal sacrifice,”72 
and charitable acts requiring considerable personal involvement.73  Several 
others have emphasized utilitarian considerations, upholding downward-
departing sentences in those situations where the adverse collateral 
consequences of incarceration (e.g., failure of a business, harm to innocent 
employees or family members, and assorted personal impacts) outweigh the 
benefits achieved by long sentences.74  Finally, in a few cases, courts have 
departed downward where defendants made especially arduous efforts to 
 
would thwart the intent of the guidelines to punish financial crimes through terms of 
imprisonment by allowing those who could pay to escape prison.  It would also create an 
unconstitutional system where the rich could in effect buy their way out of prison 
sentences.” (quoting United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1389 (7th Cir. 1994))). 
71 See Chun & Gilchrist, supra note 65, at 39. 
72 Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 394 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
73 See, e.g., Cooper, 394 F.3d at 177.  In Cooper, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld a downward departure in a pre-Booker case where the offender “mentored [an] 
underprivileged young man, who later attributed his success to [the offender].”  Id.  “[The 
offender] also paid for not one, but four young men to attend a high school together where 
they would have a better opportunity to succeed.”  Id.  These kinds of extraordinary efforts 
justified the departure.  Id. 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 804–05 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming a 
sentence of home confinement and probation where the offender demonstrated that 
incarceration would deprive his developmentally disabled son of necessary parental support); 
see also Chun & Gilchrist, supra note 65, at 39. 
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pay restitution,75 or paid restitution beyond the amount required by the 
Guidelines or the governing law.76 
II. VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION: CAN OFFENDERS AUTOCORRECT, AND 
SHOULD THEY? 
A. VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION COMPENSATES VICTIMS AND REDUCES 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS 
Among the mitigating factors discussed in the preceding Part, 
voluntary restitution is unique.  Because voluntary restitution is an 
affirmative act, intended to return ill-gotten gains directly to victims, it is 
unlike and, from a utilitarian standpoint, superior to the indirect purgation 
that may occur when an offender performs charitable works.77  In contrast 
 
75 United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that 
offenders took out loans and depleted their life savings to make restitution).  Compare 
United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2006) (declining to grant an 
offender, a former director of accounting and administration, an additional reduction to a 
below-Guidelines range sentence where the offender returned the balance of documented 
losses but “still had a net worth of $1.4 million at the time of sentencing, and . . . may have 
been able to make restitution precisely because she profited from investing the very funds 
she pilfered from her employer”), with United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (upholding a downward departure based on the fact that the offender, a cattle 
rancher who defrauded a bank by misrepresenting the amount of livestock he possessed (1) 
“voluntarily began making restitution almost a year before he was indicted,” (2) “worked 
hard to ensure that his assets received the highest possible value, including taking care of the 
crops until harvest, carefully tending the livestock until sale, and loading the hay trucks for 
the bank,” (3) “often worked sixteen-hour days,” (4) “turned over his life insurance policy 
and his wife’s certificate of deposit,” (5) “took an outside job,” (6) “gave up his home,” and 
(7) paid back “nearly ninety-four percent” of what he owed). 
76 See, e.g., Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244–45 (noting that defendants’ restitution amounted to 
140% of offenders’ share of losses incurred); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2012) 
(establishing that the need to pay restitution to victims is a relevant factor in the sentencing 
calculus).  Section 3553(a)(7) also has a utilitarian dimension in that a harsh sentence may 
undercut the offender’s ability to work in order to repay her victims.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “the district court’s goal of 
obtaining restitution for the victims of Defendant’s offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7), is better 
served by a non-incarcerated and employed defendant” (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  English sentencing law includes a similar consideration: “the making of 
reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.”  Andrew Ashworth, Re-
evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION 
AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING, supra note 59, at 21, 24. 
77 This is not to say that charitable works could not directly aid victims or aid individuals 
similarly situated to victims, but rather that the type of charitable works commonly invoked 
by individuals pursuing mitigation are often within the range of normal behavior for 
professional people and have no direct connection to the harm done.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that “advis[ing] local business 
owners, hir[ing] young people, serv[ing] on [a] church council, and rais[ing] money for 
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with generalized community volunteer service or donations to third parties, 
restitution directly repairs the harm that the offender has done.  Moreover, 
by drawing upon or, in extraordinary cases, exhausting the offender’s 
financial resources to compensate victims,78 it ensures that the offender 
bears at least some of the cost of the harm done.  In some cases, this result 
may be superior to punishment that forces the state to bear the full cost of 
harm through incarceration.79  One reason such a result may be superior in 
the white-collar context is that white-collar offenders are especially 
susceptible to specific deterrence, at least in the aggregate.  Although it has 
been argued that white-collar convictions are difficult to obtain,80 and may 
not represent the full extent of an offender’s bad acts,81 first-time fraud 
offenders are least likely among all individuals convicted of federal crimes 
to recidivate.82  In the ideal case, such as where the offender offers 
restitution in sufficient quantities to compensate the victim or victims for 
the full extent of their economic losses, and does so promptly, the offender 
becomes a partner in achieving what might be the closest possible 
approximation of an optimal response to a crime.83  With victim interests at 
 
charity” are activities that are “neither exceptional nor out of the ordinary” for a prominent 
citizen and cannot justify a downward departure). 
78 See, e.g., Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244–45 (finding, pre-Booker, that the offender’s payment 
exceeded total profits from his crime and was made at great personal cost, warranting a 
downward departure). 
79 In 2009, the average annual per-inmate incarceration cost within the federal prison 
system was $25,251.  Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg. 
6,161 (Feb. 3, 2011).   
80 Weissmann & Block, supra note 39, at 290 n.18 (“White-collar prosecutions are 
notoriously difficult to pursue successfully because they depend on complex financial 
records and often arcane regulatory schemes, and white-collar defendants are often 
represented by skilled and well-financed attorneys.”). 
81 Id. (noting that the nature of white-collar crime and the difficulty of obtaining a 
conviction in this context makes it more likely that “a ‘first time’ white-collar offender may 
have engaged in prior frauds without being detected, charged, and convicted”). 
82 The recidivism rate for first-time fraud offenders is 9.3%, less than half the rate among 
all offenders (22.1%), and the lowest among all crimes covered by the Guidelines.  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF 
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 20 ex.1, 30 ex.11 (2004), available at 
http://goo.gl/9xRgGV. 
83 “The Pareto theory of equilibrium holds that an optimum is a state in which no person 
can benefit without a corresponding detriment to another person.”  Donald V. MacDougall, 
The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives—Remedies for Constitutional Violations in 
Canada and the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608, 636 n.181 (1985).  The 
general analogy to Pareto optimality here is intended to be illustrative.  Assuming that 
victims of white-collar crime would prefer to be compensated promptly and fully, rather than 
see a maximally long sentence imposed on the offender, and assuming further that those two 
outcomes might sometimes be mutually incompatible, making use of a rule that encourages 
voluntary restitution leaves victims better off by increasing the likelihood that offenders will 
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least partly addressed, judges remain free to impose a sentence that best 
advances the remaining penal policies. 
B. ADDRESSING THE “BUYOUT” AND REDUNDANCY PROBLEMS 
Despite its positive qualities, voluntary restitution remains a 
“discouraged” factor in the Guidelines’ sentencing mitigation calculus.84  In 
part, this is due to the architecture of the Guidelines themselves.  During the 
initial Guidelines determination, sentencing judges must consider any 
relevant USSC policy statements.85  Under the policy statement governing 
departures (§ 5K2.0(d)(5)), judges may not deviate from a Guidelines 
sentence calculation in cases where a defendant pays restitution at or below 
the amount “required by law including the [G]uidelines . . . .”86  The 
relevant law and Guidelines provide that full restitution after conviction 
will usually be obligatory and may not justify a departure.  Preconviction 
restitution, however, may suffice to warrant a limited departure. The 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) requires that judges 
order full restitution to victims of all offenses against property (including 
those committed by fraud or deceit) except where assessing restitution is 
“impracticable” or otherwise imposes a burden on the sentencing process 
serious enough to outweigh victims’ need for restitution.87  The Guidelines, 
in turn, provide for limited sentencing adjustments where offenders fulfill 
their restitution obligation before conviction, and also permit additional 
departures (but only in extraordinary cases88). 
In considering defendants’ requests to accord greater mitigating effect 
to restitution payments than the Guidelines expressly provide, courts have 
 
repay victims.  Courts and law enforcement are also better off: encouraging voluntary 
restitution takes no punishment (and hence no deterrent tool) off the table, but lightens the 
financial burden associated with enforcing mandatory restitution orders and adjudicating 
civil suits for damages.  For reasons discussed infra note 120, reducing white-collar crime by 
relying on incarceration alone might be a uniquely expensive proposition.  Voluntary 
restitution permits the offender, rather than taxpayers, to shoulder some of the costs of the 
crime, reducing the costs to society where the judge deems the repayment sufficient to 
mitigate the sentence.  Finally, by creating an opportunity for offenders to engage in self-
initiated remedial behavior, courts encourage offenders to accept responsibility, benefitting 
society at large.  The stakeholders whose punitive interests are left worse off in this equation 
are those who favor retributive punishment or incapacitation over other punitive policies, 
notwithstanding the associated actual or opportunity costs. 
84 United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004).  
85 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, at § 1B1.1(b). 
86 Id. § 5K2.0(d)(5). 
87 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012)). 
88 For a discussion of how the Guidelines address preconviction restitution, see infra Part 
III.B.  
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sometimes concluded that the foregoing authorities make such mitigation 
unnecessarily redundant.  Courts have also expressed concern that 
additional mitigation might send the wrong message to offenders and 
would-be offenders by suggesting, in effect, that money can buy a ticket out 
of jail.89  Neither concern should foreclose this Comment’s proposed 
reform.  In addressing the significant mandatory restitution collection gap, 
increased restitution-based mitigation complements existing restitutionary 
sanctions and furthers the compensatory goals already established by 
restitution statutes and the Guidelines.  By formally encouraging victim 
remediation while leaving robust carceral sanctions in place, restitution-
based mitigation avoids the “buyout” problem that sometimes arises when 
defendants urge courts to waive carceral sanctions altogether.  The 
following Sections discuss both the “buyout” and “redundancy” concerns in 
greater detail. 
1. The “Buyout” Problem 
 When defendants make restitution and seek mitigation in excess of the 
amount prescribed by the Guidelines, courts have expressed concern that 
excessive mitigation might create a perception that an offender can buy her 
way out of jail.90  This is a well-justified concern: unconstrained, the 
substitution of cash payments for time served undermines the deterrence, 
retributive, and exemplary goals set forth in § 3553(a)(2).  If would-be 
offenders believe that they will be able to purchase leniency by voluntarily 
making restitution, they might be less likely to act lawfully in the first 
place, especially if they are capable of repaying victims in the event that 
they are caught.91  In turn, members of the public might notice this cost–
benefit phenomenon and lose faith in courts’ ability to impartially 
administer justice. 
Because courts have endeavored to dispel the perception that white-
collar offenders can simply buy their way out of prison sentences, it is 
critically important to distinguish limited restitution-based mitigation from 
such a “buyout” scenario.  Structural context provides one important point 
of distinction.  Under a system of ad hoc mitigation in which offenders 
might be able to fully avoid serving time for serious crimes, “buyout” (and 
its consequences) will likely arise from time to time.  Where, however, the 
restitution-based mitigation is expressly defined, limited in scope, and 
 
89 See, e.g., United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 2010). 
90 Id. 
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012); see also Weissmann & Block, supra note 39, at 
290 (arguing that Enron-era scandals demonstrated that then-existing civil and criminal 
penalties underdeterred white-collar criminals). 
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yields the lion’s share of benefits to victims rather than offenders, “buyout” 
is far less likely to occur.  Two additional considerations further distinguish 
such limited restitution-based mitigation from “buyout” mitigation: the 
focus on victim interests required by § 3553(a)(7), and the proportional 
relationship between such mitigation and existing carceral punishment. 
The Ninth Circuit’s United States v. Rangel92 decision illustrates how 
prioritizing victim interests can justify construing restitution as a remedial, 
rather than evasive, recourse.  In Rangel, the circuit court held that the 
district judge did not abuse his discretion when he imposed on an offender 
an above-Guidelines sentence (twenty-nine months, or about 12% above the 
Guidelines maximum93) in response to the offender’s failure to mitigate $20 
million in losses that he caused.94  There, the district court did not consider 
“Rangel’s inability to pay restitution itself as an aggravating factor in 
imposing a longer sentence, but focused instead on the impact on the 
victims of Rangel’s crimes.”95  The circuit court approvingly acknowledged 
this critical distinction and noted that the sentence rested on the “restitution 
to the victims” factor of § 3553,96 rather than on a motive to “punish Rangel 
for his inability to pay.”97  Accordingly, the court explained, the sentence 
responded to “the financial ruin that Rangel caused his victims, and the 
length of time it would take them to recover their losses,”98 rather than to 
Rangel’s financial status. 
The utilitarian focus of § 3553(a)(7)99 points to a difference between 
sentence-mitigating restitution and “buyout.”  While “buyout” amounts to 
the avoidance of a prison term, sentence-mitigating restitution properly 
considers the status of victims and should never justify wholly noncarceral 
punishment unless the rest of the § 3553(a) analysis supports doing so 
under truly extraordinary circumstances.  A hypothetical reversed Rangel 
scenario further illustrates this difference. 
Under such a scenario, the offender has repaid the $20 million owed to 
victims, and the court notes his repayment when consulting § 3553(a)(7) at 
sentencing.  Since the “restitution” factor cuts in the offender’s favor, the 
 
92 697 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012). 
93 Id. at 799–800. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 804. 
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7). 
97 Rangel, 697 F.3d at 804 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. 
99 This victim-driven inquiry has also informed decisions to impose custodial sentences 
on independently wealthy offenders who do not need to stay employed in order to pay court-
ordered restitution.  See, e.g., United States v. Miell, 744 F. Supp. 2d 904, 948–49, 955–56, 
960 (N.D. Iowa 2010). 
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court holds that the offender might be eligible for a reduced sentence, or at 
least does not deserve an upward-departing one.100  Such an outcome would 
be superior to the one obtained in the real world Rangel.  The victims would 
be compensated, reducing the vast consequential losses stemming from the 
crimes.  Since the need to pay restitution is only one of several 
considerations in the § 3553 rubric, and only comes into play following the 
initial Guidelines determination, the judge may (and almost certainly will) 
impose a sufficient custodial sentence and any other sanctions necessary to 
carry forward the other punitive goals set forth in the statute.   
In his appeal, the Rangel defendant argued that the district court’s 
application of § 3553(a)(7) violated settled principles of sentencing equity.  
Under Williams v. Illinois and Tate v. Short, a judge may not excessively 
aggravate a custodial sentence101 or impose an ad hoc custodial sentence102 
based on an offender’s inability to pay a fine.  Relatedly, under Bearden v. 
Georgia, a judge cannot revoke an offender’s probation because the 
offender has blamelessly failed to pay a fine or make restitution.103  These 
decisions make clear that indigent offenders should not face incarceration 
simply because they cannot, due to no fault of their own, satisfy the 
conditions of a fine-only punishment.104  They do not, however, address 
statutorily authorized carceral punishment that accounts for the interests of 
victims of economic crimes.  The Rangel court recognized this distinction, 
and concluded that courts may consider the status of victims when applying 
§ 3553(a)(7).105 
Tate, Williams, and Bearden support the broader proposition that 
“class and wealth distinctions . . . have no place in criminal sentencing.”106  
 
100 The appropriate size of the reduction depends on other determinations the judge 
makes during the sentencing process. 
101 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that a court may not 
impose a longer prison term based on the defendant’s inability to pay a fine). 
102 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396–97 (1971). 
103 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1980). 
104 Id. at 667–68, 672. 
105 Rangel, 697 F.3d at 803–04 (“A sentencing court is empowered to consider whether 
the victims will receive restitution from the defendant in varying from the Sentencing 
Guidelines based on § 3553(a) factors.”). 
106 Rangel, 697 F.3d at 804 (quoting United States v. Burgum, 633 F.3d 810, 816 (9th 
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The appellant in Tate served a custodial 
sentence on a Houston, Texas prison farm for his inability to pay outstanding traffic fines, 
despite the fact that the Houston traffic court had no authority to impose custodial sentences.  
401 U.S. at 396.  The appellant in Williams, convicted of petty theft, received a sentence 101 
days longer than the statutory maximum pursuant to a court order that he “work off” the 
balance of his unpaid fines at the rate of $5 per day.  399 U.S. at 236–37 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In Bearden, the offender received a suspended sentence, plus fines and 
restitution, for burglary and “theft by receiving stolen property;” he then lost his job, and 
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This manifestly valid proposition does not require courts to remain blind to 
the status of the victims at sentencing, and it should not require courts to 
disregard an offender’s decision to return to victims ill-gotten gains.  The 
initial Guidelines sentence calculation for white-collar punishment is 
pegged to the extent of financial loss arising from the wrongful act.107  
Acknowledging an offender’s efforts to remediate that loss and return ill-
gotten gains need not undermine such proportional punishment, much less 
implicate Tate–Williams–Bearden issues.  Instead, providing an offender 
with an opportunity to promptly and responsibly return illicit profit makes 
use of a valuable and long-established remedial tool, and offers offenders a 
final opportunity to engage in socially beneficial corrective behavior (i.e., to 
“autocorrect”) before sentencing.  If restitution-based mitigation is 
unavailable, the offender has a powerful incentive to spend wildly or hide 
her ill-gotten gains for as long as she can.  
One issue relevant to an equal protection inquiry is whether making a 
restitution-based mitigation channel available specifically for white-collar 
offenders would encourage a return to the pre-Sentencing Reform Act era, 
when white-collar offenders tended to receive more lenient sentences than 
other offenders.108  After several decades of white-collar sentencing reform, 
the law governing white-collar crime has shifted considerably, making this 
concern less pressing than it was twenty-five years ago.109  Guidelines-
range sentences, still the source of the predominating norms, are stiffer.  In 
addition, thanks to the efforts of Congress and the USSC, federal white-
collar criminal law is more sophisticated than it was before the Sentencing 
Reform Act took effect.  The reform outlined in the following Part 
corresponds directly with the Guidelines, prescribing mitigation in 
proportion to the existing sentencing framework.  Carving out a wider role 
for voluntary restitution in this manner might modestly reduce the overall 
 
failed to make a timely payment on his fine and restitution.  461 U.S. at 603.  The state, in 
turn, imposed a carceral sentence on the offender.  Id. 
107 See STEER, supra note 26, at 2.  Under the Guidelines, economic crimes leading to 
smaller losses lead to lower initial sentencing calculations.  In a hypothetical securities fraud 
situation where an offender reaps no ill-gotten gains or causes minimal provable losses, the 
Tate–Williams–Bearden inquiry might be different and so might the proper punishment. 
108 Id. at 1 (“The group of commissioners who developed the initial sentencing 
guidelines for individual defendants used a systematic approach, which included a rather 
sophisticated measurement of past sentencing practices.  Analyzing this research, the 
Commission noted some apparent inequities.  For example, generally speaking, ‘blue-collar’ 
theft and property destruction offenses were being sentenced more severely than ‘white-
collar’ fraud offenses that caused comparable dollar harm.  Furthermore, economic crimes 
generally were punished less severely than other criminal conduct that the Commission 
considered to be of equivalent seriousness.”).  
109 See supra Part I.A. 
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length of custodial sentences served by white-collar offenders, but it need 
not reduce the proportion of offenders who receive a substantial custodial 
sentence pursuant to the Guidelines analysis and a careful balancing of the 
remaining § 3553 factors.  If implementing the reform is guided by a set of 
rigorous standards, it will not function any differently than other sentencing 
adjustments.  To the extent that it further incorporates nonretributive 
considerations into the sentencing process, it will not be much different 
from alternative and complementary sentencing programs.  Such programs 
are not new: pretrial diversion,110 drug courts,111 and court-ordered 
community service112 operate nationwide and address a wide range of 
offenses.  Given the long-standing operation of these alternative sentencing 
programs alongside carceral punishment, the expansion of restitution-based 
mitigation within the conventional sentencing process would not likely be 
disruptive. 
Regardless, the act of paying restitution does not negate any element 
of the crime.  The offender does not escape conviction, incarceration, or the 
consequences (personal, professional, and otherwise) stemming therefrom.  
The sentencing judge still must conduct a § 3553(a) analysis and craft a 
sentence that best effectuates all of the relevant penal policies.  The court 
might also impose additional penalties (such as asset forfeiture and 
additional mandatory restitution) if evidence indicates that the offender has 
garnered, but not disgorged, additional ill-gotten gains in connection with 
the offense.113  The offender making restitution accordingly would not 
 
110 Federal pretrial diversion programs, established by the Pretrial Services Act of 1982, 
Pub L. No. 97-267, 96 Stat. 1136, and governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152–56 (2012), are available 
to many defendants at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 22.100 
[hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL], available at http://goo.gl/RPv2tW (last updated 
Apr. 2011).  There is some concern, however, that pretrial diversion has failed to gain traction 
in the federal courts.  See, e.g., Joseph M. Zlatic et al., Pretrial Diversion: The Over-Looked 
Pretrial Services Evidence-Based Practice, 74 FED. PROBATION 28, 28–29 (2010). 
111 In 2009, over 2,400 drug courts operated in the United States, including 30 in federal 
district courts.  WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., 
PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 & tbl.2 (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/4lbCL7. 
112 In federal court, judges may assign community service as a condition of probation.  
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 8B1.3. 
113 Such a situation might obtain where the offender uses the proceeds of her illegal act 
to make profitable investments.  To avoid unjust enrichment or to ensure adequate specific 
deterrence and retribution, the court in these situations could impose complementary 
punishments, such as asset forfeiture.  For a discussion of situations where restitution might 
be insufficient and an explanation of how asset forfeiture might complement it, see 
Nicholson, supra note 12, at 370–77.  
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escape punishment, but rather would receive punishment tailored to both 
the offense and the balance of unmitigated harm, if any, that remains. 
2. The Redundancy Problem 
On its face, the widespread use of mandatory restitution in sentencing 
calls into question the value and relevancy of any voluntary restitution 
scheme.  Mandatory restitution is a well-established component of white-
collar criminal punishment114 and may achieve some of the same 
compensatory goals.  This invites a question: what purpose does voluntary 
restitution serve if offenders are already required (as they are in many 
cases) to disgorge what remains of their ill-gotten gains? 
Voluntary restitution offers several practical advantages over the 
current approach.  Since mandatory restitution only occurs after 
adjudication, victims must wait and endure hardship until after the criminal 
proceedings have drawn to a close.  Indeed, victims may wait indefinitely to 
collect.  While mandatory restitution is a predictable consequence of white-
collar criminal prosecution, actual postconviction collection is not.115  As of 
2002, uncollected federal criminal debt amounted to $25 billion, with 
mandatory victim restitution accounting for about 70%.116  Between 2000 
and 2002, criminal debt collection rates stood around 4%, falling from 7% 
during the late 1990s.117  Even if collection rates stood at 100%, offenders 
expecting prosecution or conviction would still have considerable 
incentives to hoard, hide, or perhaps rapidly spend the funds they obtained 
before losing access to them upon conviction.118  In either scenario, courts 
 
114 See COURTNEY SEMISCH, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2009), available at http://goo.gl/OsqgAu (“A 
substantial proportion of larceny (67.6%), fraud (65.2%), and other white collar (58.9%) 
offenders were ordered to pay restitution as part of their sentences.”). 
115 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-338, CRIMINAL DEBT: ACTIONS STILL 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN JUSTICE’S COLLECTION PROCESSES 2–3 (2004), 
available at http://goo.gl/pdnfjO.  Similarly low collection rates prevail in the context of 
federal criminal and civil fines, with collection possibly as low as 10%.  Ezra Ross & Martin 
Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and 
Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 473–74 (2011). 
116 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 115, at 2–3. 
117 Id. 
118 In response to a Government Accountability Office inquiry, the Department of Justice 
explained that offender behavior reduces the pool of funds available for the eventual 
satisfaction of criminal debt:  
During the intervals between criminal activities and the related judgments[,] . . . dispositions and 
circumstances involving the offenders’ assets or the offenders often occur that create major debt 
collection challenges . . . .  [C]riminals with any degree of sophistication, especially those 
engaged in fraudulent criminal enterprises, commonly dissipate their criminal gains quickly and 
in an untraceable manner.  Assets acquired illegally are often rapidly depleted on intangible and 
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may conclude that victim harm is a sunk cost.  When this is so, a judge may 
order the offender to serve a stiff custodial sentence.119  If the judge 
imposes such a sentence, two innocent groups—the offender’s victims and 
the taxpaying public—must pay a price.120 
By encouraging voluntary restitution, courts will reduce collection 
problems and encourage more prompt and complete victim redress.  While 
perpetrators of massive frauds may cause losses that far exceed their ill-
gotten gains (and will hence be unable to make sufficient restitution), many 
white-collar offenders are capable of repaying their victims.121  These 
offenders may choose to make restitution more fully and more promptly if 
they know that their repayments will be considered as a mitigating factor in 
their sentencings.  In this way, restitution-based mitigation gives judges a 
more powerful sentencing tool, improving the effectiveness of punishment, 
rather than reduplicating punishments already in use. 
 
excess ‘lifestyle’ expenses.  Specifically, travel, entertainment, gambling, clothes, and gifts are 
high on the list of means to rapidly dispose of such assets.  Moreover, money stolen from others 
is rarely invested into easily located or exchanged assets, such as readily identifiable bank 
accounts, stocks or bonds, or real property. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED 
RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN 
SELECTED FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 11–12 (2005), available at http://goo.gl/ZH47RI.  In 
some cases, offenders created trusts and conveyed assets before conviction.  Id. at 13.  These 
transfers, even if traceable and revocable, create further collection problems for law 
enforcement.  Id. 
119 See United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2012).  While nothing in the 
opinion suggests that the defendant in Rangel liquidated his assets in advance of conviction, 
it is clear only that the defendant could not repay his victims after incurring massive losses.  
Id. at 799.  Many offenders who have amassed large surpluses from their crimes and 
accordingly anticipate asset seizure upon conviction have only weak incentives, if any at all, 
to serve as responsible stewards of their ill-gotten gains and avoid winding up in the same 
situation as the Rangel defendant at the time of his sentencing. 
120 Attempts to estimate the cost of crime reduction that is “purchased,” as it were, 
through increased incarceration, reach widely varying results.  Cf. Raymond Paternoster, 
How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 765, 80203 (2010) (concluding that “we can attribute anywhere from 20% to 
30% of the crime drop to imprisonment,” and that “both deterrence and incapacitation are 
equally compelling explanations” for this effect); Louis Michael Seidman, Hyper-
incarceration and Strategies of Disruption: Is There a Way Out?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 109, 
113 & n.19 (2011) (noting that scholars have estimated the crime rate reduction attributable 
to increased incarceration during the 1990s at between 2% and 5%, though others disagree).  
Recidivism rates in the white-collar context are lowest among all categories of crime.  See 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 82, at 20 ex.1, 30 ex.11.  Thus, if incapacitationthe 
fact that would-be repeat offenders are kept away from opportunities to recidivate while they 
are in prisonis responsible for incarceration’s crime reduction effect, it is at least arguable 
that the marginal cost of reducing white-collar crime through additional incarceration ranks 
highest among all categories of crime. 
121 See United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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III. PROPOSED RULES FOR THE EXPANDED CONSIDERATION OF 
VOLUNTARY RESTITUTION IN SENTENCING 
To realize the benefits of voluntary restitution, courts and the USSC 
should expand its use in the white-collar sentencing calculus.  The USSC 
should take the first step in this process by adding a new restitution-based 
mitigation framework to the Guidelines’ sentencing calculation procedure.  
This Comment proposes a framework that links modest sentencing 
reductions to timely and substantial payment of lost funds.  
To fit restitution into the individualized, evaluative sentencing 
approach encouraged post-Booker, the proposed Guidelines amendment 
contains a five-factor restitution sufficiency test.122  This test is based on 
common law factors already utilized (albeit rarely) by district courts and 
approved by circuit courts.  Over time, courts’ use of this test would 
facilitate their development of precedent that could guide the restitution-
based mitigation framework’s application to individual cases.  To avoid any 
conflicts with fines and compulsory restitution, and to provide offenders 
with an incentive to promptly repair the harm they have caused, the test 
permits courts to tailor the legal significance of restitution payments to 
reflect the promptness with which offenders make them.  Payments should 
have less of an effect if made at the time of sentencing and more of an 
effect if made earlier in the process.   
Finally, courts could also provide an opportunity for offenders to make 
or offer preconviction restitution payments without regard to whether such 
payments are deemed admissions of guilt.  They may do so by affording 
preconviction restitution payments the protection of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408. 
A. THE INITIAL STEP: GIVING RESTITUTION-BASED MITIGATION A 
DISTINCT ROLE IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS 
Given that white-collar offenders are especially responsive to 
calculable incentives,123 an institutional approach to white-collar sentencing 
that encourages voluntary restitution throughout the federal court system is 
much more likely to be effective than one gradually implemented judge by 
 
122 See infra Part III.B.1.  Even if the USSC does not adopt the proposed framework, 
judges could revisit the role of voluntary restitution by focusing, as the Rangel court did, on 
§ 3553(a)(7) (the Guidelines’ “restitution” factor) when evaluating aggravation and 
mitigation arguments at sentencing.  They could tailor their sentences according to the level 
of restitution provided.  See Rangel, 697 F.3d at 804. 
123 Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as 
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1094 (2010) (noting that “[w]hite collar 
offenders . . . are much more likely to be the rational calculators that deterrence requires”).  
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judge.124  Thus, the USSC has a special role to play in this reform.  
Although judges may now make sentencing decisions based more directly 
on their own case evaluations and penal policy analyses, all sentencing 
decisions still begin with a Guidelines calculation.125  If that calculation 
accounts for voluntary restitution, it will anchor126 the sentences at a lower 
point.  Such anchoring provides offenders with a fixed and calculable 
incentive to act.  With such an incentive in place, offenders will be able to 
structure their conduct around the certainty that their restitution will at least 
play a role during the first step in the sentencing process. 
Action by the USSC is preferable for another reason: the reform is 
most likely to be uniformly applied if it is incorporated into every 
sentencing decision in the same way.127  The best way to do this is to build 
into the Guidelines a restitution-based mitigation framework that would 
apply to the initial sentencing analysis underlying every case.  Such a 
framework could consider the extent to which a restitution payment 
 
124 Professor Julian Roberts notes that comprehensive sentencing guidance results in 
more uniform (and fairer) punishments, defines and guides the application of sentencing 
factors, reduces “intuitive” bias, and promotes public confidence in sentencing.  Julian V. 
Roberts, Punishing, More or Less: Exploring Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in 
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING, supra note 59, at 1, 2–4.  Uniform 
application of a restitution-based mitigation framework within the Guidelines will likely 
further the same ends. 
125 “The sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the 
presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 
338, 351 (2007). 
126 “Anchors cause perceptual shifts by altering the background against which focal 
stimuli are judged . . . .”  Barry Markovsky, Anchoring Justice, 51 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 213, 
213 (1988).  Anything may be an anchor if it serves as “a reference point in the judgment 
context” and is associated either with a stimulus or a response.  Id. at 214.  The initial 
Guidelines calculation, as presently utilized in the sentencing process, is a response-side 
anchor.  It considers the stimuli underlying the sentencing decision (e.g., the offender’s 
criminal history and the financial loss resulting from the offense) and provides the initial 
starting point for a judge’s sentencing analysis.  Accordingly, it establishes the basic 
parameters of the analysis.  Against these basic parameters, courts consider deviations and 
either accept them or rule them out.  See generally Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting 
Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest 
Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 
2014) (discussing the role of Guidelines anchoring in the sentencing process and proposing 
an alternative sentencing methodology intended to counteract it). 
127 The USSC has used extensive empirical research to develop most of the Guidelines.  
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 1A1.5 (explaining that, in its 
initial phases, the USSC “relied upon pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its 
own statistical analyses based on summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 
10,000 augmented presentence reports, the parole guidelines, and policy judgments”).  The 
Guidelines thus incorporate existing sentencing norms and reinforce them. 
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ameliorated proven economic loss,128 the timeliness and voluntariness of an 
offender’s payment, and the extent to which the payment demonstrated 
sincere acceptance of responsibility.  On this basis, the framework would 
prescribe modest pro rata mitigation for payments that meet a 
predetermined general threshold.  So constituted, the mitigation framework 
would not undermine the uniformity goals advanced by Congress, the 
USSC, and the courts any more than other aspects of the Guidelines’ 
sentencing calculus do.  Indeed, it would lend clarity to an area of white-
collar sentencing law that is presently bereft of workable standards.  Rather 
than herald a return to the ad hoc sentencing standards of the era preceding 
the Sentencing Reform Act, it will provide guidance not presently available.  
An example of a proposed framework, to be incorporated into the 
Guidelines’ § 3E1.1 (the “Acceptance of Responsibility” section), is 
included below.  Proposed amendments are bolded. 
  
 
128 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
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Figure 1 
§3E1.1. Acceptance of Responsibility 
(a)  If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels.  
(b)  If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level 
determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and upon 
motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the 
investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of 
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid 
preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their 
resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. 
(c)  If the offense(s) of conviction require(s) a calculation of financial loss at 
sentencing, and if 
(1) The defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), and  
(2) The defendant has made a voluntary restitution payment resulting in 
substantial victim compensation,  
decrease the offense level by up to 2 additional levels.  
 
Commentary 
Application Notes:  
(X).  In determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (c), 
appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) The degree of voluntariness exhibited by the offender; 
(2)  The efforts required to make the payment; 
(3)  The percentage of lost funds restored; 
(4)  The timing of the restitution; and 
(5)  Whether the defendant’s motive demonstrates sincere remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility. 
 
Suggested thresholds for each factor: 
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If the USSC does not add a restitution-based mitigation framework to 
the Guidelines, the benefits of performing voluntary restitution become 
much more speculative, and the incentive for offenders to take independent 
corrective action, in turn, becomes much weaker.  But all would not be lost.  
Even if the USSC does not add a restitution-based mitigation framework, 
judges may—in the exercise of their post-Booker discretion—adopt the 
foregoing restitution-based mitigation approach as a way of 
operationalizing § 3553(a)(7) (the “restitution to victims” factor) and 
ensuring that their sentences comport with the “sufficient, but no greater 
than necessary” injunction of § 3553(a).  Over time, the practice may win 
over other judges and achieve widespread use throughout the federal 
courts.129 
No matter how restitution-based mitigation enters the sentencing 
calculus, its use will achieve a variety of positive ends: more victims will be 
repaid, offenders will have an incentive to accept responsibility, 
incarceration costs will be reduced, and judges will have another tool with 
which to operationalize the § 3553 factors (especially factor (a)(7)).  These 
benefits need not compromise the deterrent effect of existing sentencing 
law.  In the post-Booker world, judges may use their familiarity with the 
facts of each case to craft a sentence that fits the crime and specifically 
deters the offender.  Owing to statutory sentencing ranges that reflect the 
shifts in white-collar sentencing norms130 over the course of the past 
twenty-five years, stiff punishments remain available when the § 3553(a) 
analysis warrants their imposition. 
 
129 The emergence of the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel illustrates how 
such a shift might occur and also how fraught its path may be.  See Kevin M. Teeven, A 
History of Promissory Estoppel: Growth in the Face of Doctrinal Resistance, 72 TENN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1126–57 (2005).  The architecture of the pre-Booker Sentencing Reform Act 
suggests legislative commitment to developing a limited “common law of sentencing”: the 
Guidelines’ departure and review mechanisms permitted judges to deviate from sentencing 
formulae and authorized appellate courts to approve these deviations under some 
circumstances.  Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a 
Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
21, 34–35 (2000); see also Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American 
Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 530 (2007); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing 
Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1455 (1997).  Owing, perhaps, to the development of appellate 
doctrines disfavoring departures, common law sentencing rules did not flourish before 
Booker.  Berman, supra, at 51–56.  After Booker, the individualized sentencing inquiry 
required by § 3553(a), coupled with a more deferential standard of review, gives judges 
more room—if not a greater incentive—to develop common law sentencing principles. 
130 See supra Part I.A. 
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B. DEFINING THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF RESTITUTION-BASED 
MITIGATION IN INDIVIDUAL CASES 
As with sentencing in general, the maxim that a sentence should be 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary”131 should govern the effect of 
voluntary restitution on an offender’s sentence. To avoid the “buyout” 
problem, restitution-based mitigation should comport with § 3553(a)(2) and 
inform sentences that are designed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense.”132  Restitution-based mitigation will align with this fundamental 
principle if it operates under several constraints, each of which are present 
in the suggested Guidelines Table offered in the foregoing Part.  The 
discussion that follows explains the importance of each. 
First, any mitigation for offenders who voluntarily provide restitution 
must not be so dramatic that it leads to disproportionally light sentences. 
Excessive leniency may reduce the general deterrent effect of white-collar 
punishment: when sentences seem trivial in comparison to the harm done, 
some individuals might see a low-cost opportunity to break the law.133  
Second, any mitigation should reflect the need for specific deterrence.  
While some white-collar offenders are highly susceptible to specific 
deterrence (as they may lose their professional positions, licenses, or 
reputations after conviction),134 others, for a variety of reasons, may be 
more likely to recidivate in the absence of a stiff sentence.  Regardless of 
the likelihood of recidivism, some sentences are so lenient that their lack of 
specific deterrence value is plainly evident.135  In light of these issues, a 
wider role for restitution-based mitigation in the sentencing calculus will 
only advance the goals of sentencing policy if its use in individual cases is 
governed by properly calibrated sufficiency standards that permit it to 
realize its desired effect without undermining the goals set forth in section 
§ 3553(a)(2).  The alternative—reliance on ad hoc standards, such as those 
currently used by courts, and the unpredictable results that follow—makes 
restitution a wild card with few (if any) meaningful behavior-influencing 
effects. 
 
131 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
132 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
133 United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that 
“[b]ecause economic and fraud-based crimes are ‘more rational, cool, and calculated than 
sudden crimes of passion or opportunity,’ these crimes are ‘prime candidate[s] for general 
deterrence’” (quoting Bibas, supra note 5, at 724)). 
134 Podgor, The Challenge, supra note 8, at 740. 
135 Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (explaining that “the message of [the offender’s] 7–day 
sentence is that would-be white-collar criminals stand to lose little more than a portion of 
their ill-gotten gains and practically none of their liberty”). 
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The Guidelines permit judges to consider most restitution payments to 
be evidence of an offender’s “acceptance of responsibility,” which triggers 
a two-level sentencing reduction.136  In exceptional cases (i.e., those where 
the restitution is “unusual and present to [a] degree substantially in excess” 
of the level at which it is ordinarily present and hence “outside the heartland 
of cases to which [Guideline] § 3E1.1 applies”137) the Guidelines permit 
downward departures.138  Before Booker, judges relied on a few general 
principles139 to assess whether restitution was exceptional in the context of a 
particular case. These principles may still provide guidance to judges 
conducting initial Guidelines determinations under the post-Booker 
sentencing process.  Nonetheless, the very nature of the pre-Booker inquiry 
(directed, as it was, toward identifying how an offender’s behavior deviates 
from the norm, however a judge might define it) made it difficult to 
establish workable standards.  The absence of mitigation-measuring 
standards presents a difficult question: “how can one white-collar criminal’s 
efforts to make restitution be extraordinary if other white-collar criminals’ 
efforts are essentially the same?”140  In post-Booker terms, the question 
might be whether a criminal’s efforts to make restitution are sufficient to 
warrant mitigation, either within the Guidelines framework or outside of it.  
Here, though, as was the case before Booker, the inquiry is largely ad hoc.  
A sufficiency test, applicable in the first instance to all cases where an 
offender makes restitution, provides guidance and encourages the 
development of a body of law that helps to answer this question. 
Additionally, restitution-based mitigation must also encourage prompt 
action by the offender.  Ideally, it will also fit within the schema of 
evidentiary rules in such a manner as to permit offenders to make restitution 
payments without creating evidence that could be used to prove their 
 
136 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 3E1.1(a) (“If the 
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the 
offense level by 2 levels.”); see also id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (“In determining whether a 
defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate considerations include, but are not 
limited to . . . (C) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt . . . .”).  A 
two-level reduction might reduce a 6- to 12-month Level 10 sentence to 0 to 6 months, a 33- 
to 41-month Level 20 sentence to 27 to 33 months, and a 292- to 356-month Level 40 
sentence to 235 to 293 months.  See id. § 5A. 
137 United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 996 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see 
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 5K2.0(a)(3). 
138 See, e.g., Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 996; United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161, 163 
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the “guidelines provide the district judge with authority to 
depart downward based on extraordinary restitution”). 
139 Typically, the arduousness of the offender’s efforts and the financial burden assumed 
by the offender played a role.  See United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999). 
140 Kannenberg, supra note 9, at 368. 
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culpability.141  The following Sections suggest how to meet each of these 
conditions. 
1. A Sufficiency Test 
Presently, voluntary restitution plays an uncertain and largely 
symbolic role in white-collar sentencing.  If an offender undertakes efforts 
to pay back her victims in advance of conviction, her efforts might 
demonstrate acceptance of responsibility142 and could justify mitigation on 
that basis.143  No provision of the Guidelines directly addresses voluntary 
restitution made after conviction, and no widely accepted sufficiency 
standard governs the effect an offender’s restitution will have at any 
procedural stage.  As a result, an offender cannot anticipate whether (or 
how) a voluntary restitution payment will impact her sentence until plea 
negotiations (and sentencing proceedings) begin; even then, the effect of the 
payment is uncertain.  Thus, offenders who wish to make an independent 
effort to promptly compensate victims may need to take a leap of faith 
when doing so.  This might be maximally significant in a moral sense,144 
but it is not clear why maximal moral significance should be the governing 
threshold, nor whether victims would prefer it to be so.145  
A clear and broadly applied sufficiency test would help to address this 
problem.  Fortunately, a working model of one already exists.  In United 
States v. Kim, a pre-Booker case, the Eleventh Circuit considered 
sufficiency factors noted by other circuits and synthesized a test for 
determining whether restitution is sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a 
 
141 See FED. R. EVID. 408. 
142 This is the role given to pre-adjudication voluntary restitution by the Guidelines.  See 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(C); see also United 
States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the Guidelines account 
for voluntary restitution payments and contemplate departures only in cases where voluntary 
restitution is extraordinary). 
143 See United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining, in a 
case where the sentencing judge ordered the offender to pay restitution, that the mitigating 
effect of additional voluntary restitution turns, in part, on whether that restitution shows 
“sincere remorse and acceptance of responsibility”); cf. Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 996 
(surveying earlier doctrine regarding the circumstances under which voluntary restitution 
could show acceptance of responsibility and warrant a downward departure). 
144 The effort to repay victims might not impact an offender’s sentence, after all, and 
accordingly is more likely to show true contrition. 
145 See Gabbay, supra note 14, at 465 (2007) (citing Heather Strang & Lawrence W. 
Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 23 
(2003) (reporting findings from a British study concluding that “when victims are asked, 
they indicate a strong preference for compensation directly by the offender,” and sometimes 
prefer a lower amount directly from an offender over a higher amount furnished by the 
government).  
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reduced sentence.146  Applying this test, a sentencing judge considers “[1] 
the degree of voluntariness, [2] the efforts to which a defendant went to 
make restitution, [3] the percentage of funds restored, [4] the timing of the 
restitution, and [5] whether the defendant’s motive demonstrates sincere 
remorse and acceptance of responsibility.”147  The Kim court joined a 
majority of circuits in permitting downward-departing mitigation based on 
extraordinary restitution.148  Although the Eleventh Circuit has rarely cited 
the Kim decision since its inception,149 its test remains in force.  Defendants 
and prosecutors elsewhere have cited the test,150 but no other circuit court 
has yet expressly adopted it.151  This is unfortunate, as it offers a superior 
alternative to the ad hoc inquiry many courts currently employ. 
 
146 United States v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).  The court drew factors 
from United States v. Oligmueller, 198 F.3d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing timing, 
voluntariness, efforts at restitution, and percentage of funds restored); United States v. 
Hairston, 96 F.3d 102, 108 (4th Cir. 1996) (accounting for the percentage of funds restored, 
efforts at restitution, voluntariness, timing, and motive); United States v. DeMonte, 25 F.3d 
343, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (factoring in voluntariness); and Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 996 
(factoring in timing and percentage of funds restored).  Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244. 
147 Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Nangle noted an additional 
consideration that might serve as a sixth factor: “[T]he defendants had no assurance that their 
restitution efforts would be rewarded by the District Court at sentencing . . . .”  Id. at 1245 
(Nangle, J., concurring). 
148 Id. at 1240 (majority opinion). 
149 Of the three Eleventh Circuit decisions that cite Kim, only one discusses the 
restitution test at any length.  Compare United States v. Lorenzo, 144 F. App’x 833, 834 
(11th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Simmons, 368 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004), with 
United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). 
In Crawford, the circuit court ordered the district judge to apply the test.  Id. at 1182.  
Kim appears to operate most frequently in the background of sentencing decisions: as of 
October 24, 2013, seventy-nine court filings available on Westlaw cite the case.  See, e.g., 
Defendant Monty Ervin’s Sentencing Memorandum at 17, United States v. Ervin, No. 
2:11cr7-MHT (M.D. Ala. May 17, 2012), 2012 WL 2476764; United States’s Sentencing 
Memorandum at 24, United States v. Berkowitz, No. 1:07-CR-063-RWS (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 
2008), 2008 WL 8083293.  In one post-Booker case later upheld by the Eleventh Circuit, the 
trial court judge analyzed the offender’s request for restitution-based mitigation under the 
Kim test and found that the offender’s conduct justified mitigation.  See Sentencing 
Memorandum at 8–10, United States v. Anderson, No. 1:06-CR-091-01-ODE (N.D. Ga. 
Mar. 2, 2007); see also United States v. Anderson, 267 F. App’x 847 (11th Cir. 2008). 
150 Cf. United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing Kim); 
United States v. Tilga, No. 1:09-cr-00865-JB, 2012 WL 1192526, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012) 
(same); United States v. Mady, No. 04-80408, 2006 WL 3147740, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 
2006) (same); United States v. Kuhn, 351 F. Supp. 2d 696, 706 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (same). 
151 Perhaps this is so because many judges still adhere to the Guidelines.  Berry, 
supra note 59, at 258; Bowman, supra note 66, at 361–62 & fig.4B.  Finding the 
Guidelines sufficient in this context, courts may remain unconvinced that the Kim test 
merits a closer look. 
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Indeed, the Kim test addresses nearly all of the dimensions of 
restitution relevant to the policy aims the proposed reform might further.  
Applying the test, the Kim court provided some guidance on how to weigh 
and balance the factors.  There, the timing of the offenders’ payments cut 
against the voluntariness factor, as the offenders only made payments 
following indictment and the completion of plea agreements.152  
Nonetheless, the court recognized that offenders may need time to assemble 
funds to make payments, and accordingly, refused to adopt a bright-line 
rule that excluded all restitution payments made after indictment or 
pursuant to plea agreements.153  In future cases, courts might view the 
“timing” and “voluntariness” factors in conjunction with one another, 
giving “autocorrection” less significance later in the procedural timeline 
unless offenders needed time to gather the necessary financial resources to 
make restitution payments.  Similarly, as in Kim, the “efforts” factor might 
exclude offenders who can easily provide restitution by virtue of their 
personal wealth.154  Grounding the test in the actual loss and amount of 
repayment, the “percentage of funds restored” factor might correspond with 
the Guidelines’ existing loss table.155  Finally, the “acceptance of 
responsibility” factor permits judges to consider whether, under all of the 
circumstances, the offender’s actions represent a cynical attempt to secure 
more lenient punishment or a genuine expression of contrition.156  The 
thresholds required to meet each Kim factor could develop as the common 
law does, allowing standards to crystallize over time and inform future 
revisions of the proposed restitution-based mitigation Guidelines 
provisions. 
Two hypotheticals illustrate how the test might work.  In the first 
example, a variation on the facts of Kim, the offender has been indicted for 
government benefits fraud.  Before conviction, the offender liquidates most 
of his savings and investments to gather the funds necessary to repay the 
government; he also secures loans from his friends and family.  Upon 
conviction, the offender pays back one hundred percent of the funds owed.  
In doing so, he explains the shame and loss of professional stature he has 
 
152 Kim, 364 F.3d at 1244. 
153 Id. 
154 In Kim, the offenders favorably impressed the court by depleting their life savings 
and taking out $200,000 in debt to pay restitution.  Id. at 1245. 
155 The Kim offenders received around two-thirds of the proceeds of a fraud scheme, but 
they personally repaid 100% of the funds wrongfully acquired.  Id. at 1238.  The court, 
applying this factor, noted that their restitution accounted for 140% of the “amount from 
which they personally benefitted.”  Id. at 1245. 
156 Here, the Kim court acknowledged “the embarrassment, the humiliation, the shame, 
[and] the sorrow” the offenders felt about their actions.  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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experienced as well as his efforts to remedy his wrongdoing.  The court is 
impressed by the offender’s efforts to gather the funds necessary to fully 
repay the government and, accordingly, takes seriously the offender’s 
statements about losing face after being charged with fraud.  The court is 
skeptical, however, as to whether Kim factors one (degree of voluntariness) 
and four (timing of the restitution) favor him: after knowingly defrauding 
the government, the offender waited until he was indicted to change course 
and repay the stolen funds.  The prosecution stresses this point and uses it to 
argue against mitigation.  After weighing each of the factors and 
considering comparable cases, the court finds that the offender’s remorse 
outweighs his delay in repaying the government, and reduces the offender’s 
sentence by two levels from the Guidelines range, as the restitution-based 
mitigation framework suggests. 
In another hypothetical example, this time a variation on the facts of 
United States v. Filipiak,157 the offender embezzles at least $2.5 million 
from her employer, a real estate investment firm.  She uses these funds to 
make personal investments that yield unknown, but likely substantial, 
returns.  Before she is charged, the offender returns the balance of 
documented losses, but responds evasively to her employer’s questions 
about the extent of the embezzlement and never provides a satisfactory 
accounting of the full scope of funds she misappropriated.  At sentencing, 
the court finds that she still has net assets in excess of $1 million, some of 
which she may have acquired by investing the funds she embezzled.  The 
court applies the Kim factors and finds that, while the offender ostensibly 
repaid the known losses voluntarily (and before she was charged), 
satisfying factors one and four, she never satisfactorily explained how much 
she embezzled.  Because the court cannot accurately measure the 
percentage of funds restored, it finds that factor three weighs against the 
offender.  The court further notes that the offender, a wealthy individual, 
easily made restitution, and after doing so still has a high net worth, thanks 
(most likely) to the proceeds of investing her ill-gotten gains.  This makes 
factor two negative.158  Finally, owing to the offender’s evasiveness and 
continued gamesmanship, the court is not persuaded that she has accepted 
responsibility for her wrongdoing, meaning that factor five is also negative.  
After noting the negative impact of the factors addressing the offender’s 
candor and remorse, the court is torn between declining to deviate from the 
premitigation Guidelines range on the basis that the offender has not 
 
157 466 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2006). 
158 Such a scenario also suggests that asset forfeiture might be used here to craft an 
appropriate punishment.  See McCaw, supra note 12, at 197–203. 
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sufficiently accepted responsibility, or giving the offender some credit for 
her restitution, which all sides agree has been substantial.159 
Despite the offender’s continuing suspicious conduct, the court 
acknowledges that the offender’s restitution payment has addressed some of 
the harm she caused to her former employer.  While some doubt remains as 
to whether she has provided full restitution, the quantity is substantial 
enough, and the timing of the payment early enough, to warrant taking her 
payment into account as a mitigating factor.  Here, as in the actual Filipiak 
case, the court notes that the offender has not fully accepted responsibility 
for the offense and imposes a substantial custodial sentence to “promote 
respect for the law” per § 3553(a)(2)(A).160  Even while doing so, however, 
the court notes that factor § 3553(a)(7)—the “need to provide restitution to 
any victims”—tilts in the offender’s favor.161  Of course, if the situation 
were modified such that it was clear that the offender provided a full 
account of the funds she embezzled (and, in turn, returned them all to their 
rightful owners), and undertook laborious efforts to obtain the necessary 
funds, her mitigation case under the Kim factors would be stronger, and the 
resulting sentence would accordingly reflect that strength. 
2. Encouraging Prompt Restitution Payment 
To encourage prompt action by offenders, it is important to establish 
clear rules that govern how the timing of a restitution payment may impact 
a sentence.  At a minimum, the restitution-based mitigation test should 
encourage at least substantial payment before sentencing, since the offender 
will almost certainly be ordered to pay post-sentencing restitution pursuant 
to the MVRA.162  Moreover, payments made at this point may have the 
appearance of a “buyout,” and thus, if given excessive weight in mitigation, 
might diminish the offender’s and the public’s respect for the law. 
On the other hand, an offender (as in Kim) might have difficulty 
assembling the funds necessary to make restitution before he is sentenced.  
A bright-line rule excluding all post-indictment restitution payments could 
disproportionately favor offenders with abundant liquid assets.  To address 
this problem, the rule could presumptively exclude postconviction, 
presentencing restitution payments, and the offender could rebut the 
 
159 This was what actually happened in Filipiak.  The court sentenced the offender to a 
term of twenty-four months (nine months less than the Guidelines range).  Filipiak, 466 F.3d 
at 582.  The offender appealed.  Id.  Noting that the facts of the case suggested less-than-total 
acceptance of responsibility, the circuit court declined to vacate the sentence.  Id. at 584. 
160 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
161 Id. § 3553(a)(7). 
162 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012).  
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presumption by demonstrating that he took meaningful steps to gather the 
funds necessary to make restitution before that time. 
3. Voluntary Restitution as Evidence of Guilt 
In most cases, restitution-based mitigation should only be available to 
offenders who admit guilt.163  In the rare event that a mitigation-eligible 
case goes to trial, the prosecution might seek to offer evidence of an 
offender’s efforts to pay restitution to her victims as evidence of culpability.  
Given that the goal of the proposed restitution-based mitigation is in fact to 
encourage culpable offenders to accept responsibility and promptly remedy 
their bad acts, such a result could have a chilling effect on at least some of 
the desired conduct.  If paying restitution amounts to an admission of guilt 
(as juries would almost certainly deem it to be), then offenders with a bona 
fide basis to contest the charges against them might be less likely to 
“autocorrect,” choosing instead to take their chances at sentencing.  
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (the “Compromise Offers and 
Negotiations” Rule) most directly addresses this concern.164  It bars the 
introduction of evidence that an offender “furnish[ed], promis[ed] or 
offer[ed]—or accept[ed], promis[ed] to accept, or offer[ed] to accept—a 
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise [a] 
claim” as well as evidence of “conduct or a statement made during 
compromise negotiations about the claim” when a party attempts to 
introduce that evidence to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a 
disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a 
contradiction.”165  The Rule applies to evidence of settlement negotiations 
between private parties, but not to evidence of a negotiation “in a criminal 
case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the 
exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.”166  It 
also permits the introduction of settlement evidence to show “a witness’s 
 
163 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 37, § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.2 
(“[Sentence adjustment for acceptance of responsibility] is not intended to apply to a defendant 
who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements 
of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.  Conviction by trial, 
however, does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction.  
In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his 
criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial . . . in each such 
instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based 
primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.”).    
164 FED. R. EVID. 408.  
165 Id. at 408(a).  
166 Id. at 408(a)(2).  
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bias or prejudice, negat[e] a contention of undue delay, or prov[e] an effort 
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”167 
The drafters of Rule 408 intended to promote open settlement 
negotiations, including negotiations in cases where an offender may face 
overlapping civil and criminal liability.168  To prevent misuse of the Rule, 
the drafters also specifically noted that it should not be used where a 
defendant seeks to “‘buy off’ the prosecution or a prosecuting witness in a 
criminal case.”169  Courts have applied the Rule to bar the use of settlement 
offers to prove guilt in criminal cases170 and should similarly use it to 
insulate good faith attempts to “autocorrect” in those rare cases where a 
defendant compensates claimants (or potential claimants) and also has a 
legitimate reason to contest the charges against him. 
CONCLUSION 
After twenty years of sentencing reform, the norms governing white-
collar sentencing have shifted: Congress and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission have established strict penalties for existing white-collar 
offenses and created altogether new offenses.  To the extent that these 
developments have fostered more proportional and equitable 
punishments,171 furthered the goals of specific and general deterrence,172 
 
167 Id. at 408(b).  
168 See McAuliffe v. United States, 514 F. App’x 542, 549 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A 2006 rule 
amendment . . . conclusively settled a circuit split in favor of applying Rule 408 in criminal 
cases . . . .”).  The 2006 advisory committee notes explained that Rule 408 applies in 
criminal cases because private parties who engage in compromise negotiations cannot 
“protect against the subsequent use of statements in criminal cases by way of private 
ordering,” and in the absence of an evidentiary bar, individuals expecting criminal 
prosecution might “refus[e] to admit fault” or otherwise avoid settlement.  FED. R. EVID. 408 
advisory committee’s note. 
169 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.  
170 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852, 859–61 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  In Davis, 
the circuit court vacated the appellant’s conviction after concluding that the trial court erred 
by admitting evidence of the appellant’s unsuccessful offer to return a fraction of the funds 
he allegedly stole from his employer.  Id.  Prosecutors expressly stated that they intended to 
use this evidence to prove guilt rather than to prove obstruction of a criminal investigation, 
and the circuit court held that admitting the evidence for this purpose was reversible error.  
Id. at 861.  Nonetheless, evidence derived from settlement discussions may be admissible for 
other purposes.  See, e.g., McAuliffe, 514 F. App’x at 548–50 (concluding that the trial court 
properly allowed the government to introduce a recording of a purported settlement 
negotiation to prove the offender’s “knowledge of and participation in illegal acts—in other 
words, his state of mind”).  
171 See STEER, supra note 26, at 1–2.  
172 They have furthered the goals of specific and general deterrence by imposing 
punishments that make white-collar crimes more costly. 
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and incapacitated dangerous individuals,173 they are laudable.  But low 
criminal debt collection rates demonstrate that victim interests now need 
closer attention.  White-collar crime causes economic harm in the first 
instance, and incarceration alone, though surely useful for the purposes of 
communicating society’s disapproval of bad acts, may not remedy victims’ 
harm as fully as might be possible under the circumstances.  As long as 
criminal debt collection rates remain at low levels, plenty of room for 
improvement remains.  Voluntary restitution may remedy the harm caused 
by white-collar crime at the place where its effects have been most directly 
felt.  In addition to improving victims’ economic well-being, voluntary 
restitution may also be morally significant. An affirmative compensatory 
act by the offender may demonstrate acceptance of responsibility and 
restore social trust and goodwill, especially if the offender must work 
arduously to provide it.  While a court may (and in many circumstances, 
must) order restitution, it can only do so after an adjudication of guilt.  
Ordering restitution at sentencing does not require the offender to accept 
any responsibility for his crime and does not discourage financial 
gamesmanship by offenders.  Under the present sentencing structure, these 
unfortunate consequences are inevitable. 
Seeking to improve the existing sentencing process by encouraging 
victim remediation and discouraging gamesmanship by offenders, this 
Comment’s proposed reform sets forth potential components of a workable  
reform.  It avoids the “buyout” problem by limiting mitigation and linking it 
to existing Guidelines sentences.  It is governed by context-sensitive 
sufficiency standards, encourages prompt action by offenders, and 
complements existing punitive devices.174  By providing offenders with the 
opportunity to take self-correcting action, it may encourage rehabilitation.  
Rather than waiting to see what the judge might order, offenders could own 
up to their crimes and take steps to repair the damage they have caused.  In 
giving judges a set of criteria they may use to mitigate an offender’s 
sentence when an offender has taken meaningful steps to repair the harm he 
has caused, the proposed reform leads to more economically efficient 
results: redress places the victims in a better position than they would have 
been in if the offenders had no incentive to promptly repay them, and the 
 
173 They have incapacitated dangerous individuals by punishing repeat offenders more 
severely. 
174 In other words, an offender’s restitution payment should be considered to mitigate 
only to the extent that it conforms to the priority order set by statutes and federal law.  It 
should not supplant or preclude the payment of fines or back taxes, or substitute for the 
repossession of assets where statutes require such measures in the first instance.  Rather, 
voluntary restitution should be considered in mitigation in those situations where 
compulsory restitution or incarceration may be used to punish the offender. 
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government incurs fewer expenses in connection with enforcing criminal 
judgments and incarceration. 
No punishment, including long carceral sentences, can ever undo a 
crime.  Many punishments, however, can serve a corrective purpose.  By 
encouraging white-collar offenders to “autocorrect,” this Comment’s 
proposed restitution-based mitigation framework would permit the USSC 
and courts to build on past reforms and take an additional step toward 
“calibrat[ing] white-collar sentences.”175  For victims and for the 
overstressed federal criminal justice system, such a step is long overdue. 
 
 
175 Bibas, supra note 5, at 739. 
